From: Gerald O'Connell <goc.nul>
Date: Thu, 29 Sep 2011 14:54:38 +0100
Archived: Thu, 29 Sep 2011 10:47:26 -0400
Subject: Re: D'oh! Light Speed Threshold Broken?


>From: Martin Shough <parcellular.nul>
>To: <post.nul>
>Date: Thu, 29 Sep 2011 09:35:21 +0100
>Subject: Re: D'oh! Light Speed Threshold Broken?

<snip>

>I personally suspect that the entanglement correlations reflect
>the fact that every particle state at every local "here and now"
>is, despite the habits of "fuzzy" thinking in which 20thC
>quantum theory has entrained us, _rigidly_determined_
>(calculably or not) by an exhaustively-interconnnected,
>nonlocal, cosmic causal background, but only probabilistically
>connected to its local past. One way of framing this point of
>view would be to say that it turns the old argument against sub-
>quantum "hidden variables" inside out, by "hiding" them
>_everywhere_. The "missing" half of the causal structure is in
>the cosmic future of every measurement. We only see the the
>palimpsest of that nonlocal imaginary background in
>correlations, where it generates the here-and-now, sandwiched in
>a press between it and the probabilistic local past. I also see
>this global background as being the donator of gravitational and
>inertial mass.

Excellent. I think you are spot on with this Martin.

Doesn't this view echo Bohm's Implicate Order conjecture?

One small point I would make concerns your terminology: when you
say 'only' probabilistically I'm not sure in what sense you use
the word 'only'. Are you suggesting that the element of
causality is somehow weak or loose (for want of better terms)
because it is probabilistic? If that were the case then I would
suggest that this idea fails to take into account the full
implications of your view insofar as it clearly (to me at least,
which is no guarantee...) _does_ echo Bohm's line of thought. We
would need to view the causality involved as arising (strongly
and definitely) from structures in the implicate order, and
their probabilistic nature as a facet of their particular
manifestation in the explicate order as we experience it
empirically. I've long felt that there is some sort of
justification for this view deriving from Ramsey Theory where
sufficiently large objects must necessarily contain a given
substructure and complete disorder is impossible.

If there is merit in this view, then it leaves the way open, in
theory at least, for local explicate violations of 'causality'
(and, cf my previous post, an accompanying major revision of the
validity of inductive reasoning) without abandoning a view of
causality in which deductive reasoning still stands up (cf my
previous post's remark on conclusions embedded in axioms) by
virtue of consistency at the implicate (as you have variously
put it 'global' or 'cosmic') level. To me, Ramsey Theory
suggests something about the nature of the connection between
the implicate and explicate orders, and offers a clue as to why
some aspects of our explicate zone, might look to us, at bottom,
probabilistic.

So when Einstein suggested that God doesn't play dice with the
universe he might have been right. Perhaps God is the dice.

[I've just re-read this before posting, and I'm amused by the
irony of my picking up on and then nit-picking at one little
piece of terminology, only to then introduce a barrow-load of
imprecise terminology of my own. Apologies for that, and I hope
you still get my drift...]

--

Gerald O'Connell
http://www.saatchionline.com/gacoc


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