From: Martin Shough <parcellular.nul> Date: Wed, 27 Apr 2011 11:42:03 +0100 Archived: Wed, 27 Apr 2011 06:56:04 -0400 Subject: Re: Trindade 'Negative Witness' Found >From: Kentaro Mori <kentaro.mori.nul> >To: post.nul >Date: Sun, 24 Apr 2011 13:03:44 -0300 >Subject: Re: Trindade 'Negative Witness' Found >>From: Thiago Ticchetti <ticchetti.nul> >>To: post.nul >>Date: Sun, 24 Apr 2011 08:48:05 -0300 >>Subject: Re: Trindade 'Negative Witness' Found <snip> >>And about the details forgotten by these 6 years-study as the >>ship radio signals failure when the UFO appeared? >The only source for that was Barauna himself. All the problems >in the ship's machinery were recorded on the ship's log. And >there were many. Hi Kentaro I know you told me you don't wish to answer my posts, but you will forgive me responding to yours. I would like someone to give a reference for this "radio signals failure" which Kentaro says came from Barauna. I don't recall this claim specifically. In 1982 he recalled a power failure, which isn't quite the same thing. Is this what you mean? Something like this "recalled" decades later ought IMO opinion to receive little attention. But any attention we do give to it must be proportionate and realistic and take full account of the passage of time and the human context, so I want to emphasis the evolution of this idea. In a 1967 statement he had already spoken about the ship's machinery, but he did _not_ then claim that there was a power failure coincident with the sighting. In fact he was specific that this was only "rumour": "According to rumors I heard on the deck, the ship's electric equipment stopped working during the appearance of the object. What I can confirm is that after the ship left the island it stopped three times and the officials didn't have a firm explanation about what was happening. Every time the ship stopped, the lights faded out slowly until they were totally off. When it happened the officers walked to the deck with their binoculars, however, the sky was already full of clouds and they were not able to see anything." http://www.openminds.tv/trindade-ufo-case-205/ (There follows a slightly augmented extract from my UpDates post of 28.08.2010 commenting on this statement) So in 1967 Barauna was referring to "rumours" he had heard to the effect that there was a power failure at the sighting.time, but had no knowledge of it himself. As students of the case know, there appears to be no contemporary evidence (for example, in the ship's log) that such a thing actually occurred, but Barauna's recollection of this story in a casual discussion with Hynek, Sprinkle and others in 1982 has hitherto been treated by critics as having the status of a "report", having a weight comparable to that of statements made in 1958, and therefore meriting forensic dissection in search of damning contradictions. Asked in 1982 the naive question "did the ship's radar detect the object?" (for all the world as though he were spokesman for the Navy and ought to know) Barauna recalled that there had been a strange radar blip _before_ the sighting, but that the radar wasn't working during the sighting because the power had failed. I've often cautioned that this appears to reflect newspaper stories from the time. The radar may or may not have been operating and/or manned at the time of the sighting on Jan 16 (it was just a marine navigation radar and the ship was still anchor off Portuguese Beach), but two newspapers did report that an odd blip had been detected at the _same_time_ of day but on the _previous_ day , Jan 15, which the operator believed to have been merely an electronic fault. (See my other post on this subject for more detail about the radar issue). Barauna knew of these stories by the time he first mentioned the issue himself, about a fortnight after they were published, and he also probably knew by this time what the Navy Intelligence Dept had confidentially required to be reported from Trindade personnel in connection with its 1958 investigation into UFO sightings at the island :- Any signs of interference with engines and electrical equipment. The seeds of the idea of a radar incident, coupled with some kind of electronic failure, are probably sown early in 1958. The 1967 document quoted above is interesting because it is intermediate in time between 1958 and 1982 and it shows us Barauna incorporating the "power failure" story into his narrative, still being explicit that it was based only on "rumour" but connecting the rumour with other facts from his own experience: "what I can confirm is that after the ship left the island it stopped three times and the officials didn't have a firm explanation about what was happening." Notice that Barauna is saying that he can _not_ confirm personally this "rumour" that power failed at the sighting time. He can only confirm that the ship's engines and generator power stopped at several _other_ times_ for reasons unknown to him. And this tends to fit the ship's log, which does indeed record that after departing the island the ship's "machinery" was stopped for unspecified repairs at 16:35, restarted at 16:55, then stopped again at 18:18, and repaired again at 19:33. All of this, stirred in with the remembered "rumour" running around the boat in 1958 of power failure at the sighting time, and those newspaper stories of a radar failure with the date displaced in memory by one day, could easily have added up to the 24-year-old "memory" in 1982 that there _had_ been a power failure at the sighting time and a radar incident _before_ the sighting time. This impression would aloso have seemed to fit in with his recollection that the boat winching operation underway at the time had stopped when the UFO was seen, because the electric winch could have failed. (Of course there can be other, simpler explanations of why the winchman stopped winching when people shouted there was a flying saucer approaching the ship.) Add in the pinch of bravado felt by a witness being feted by Prof Hynek and several wide-eyed admirers at a UFO conference, and it doesn't surprise me that what sounds like a tape of an after-dinner conversation a quarter of a century later (probably over a drink or two, but extant participants may correct me) contains a couple of things like this. I don't believe it has anything like the weight and significance of a calculated "lie", and IMO it really takes a deliberate _effort_ to construe it as reflecting in a sinister way on the testimony from 1958. >No problem was recorded for the time of the >sighting, which in itself also wasn't recorded. We assume the >sighting wasn't recorded because it wasn't considered important >-- an assumption which may be one of the only reasonable >explanations for the fact they didn't confiscate the negatives >on the spot. By "they" you must mean either the chain of command of the Trindade Island operations, or the ship's chain of command. The former stopped with Capt Bacellar. Captain Bacellar was also at the time tasked by the Navy High Command to collect information on sightings at Trindade. We know that Bacellar was the one who took personal responsibility on board for overseeing the photo development etc, the one from whom Barauna then received permission to retain the negatives (temporarily) on certain conditions, and the one with whom he agreed arrangements to hand over negs and prints to the Navy later. So we know for certain that it is not a "reasonable explanation" to suppose that the sighting "wasn't considered important" by Capt Bacellar. The ship's chain of command stopped with Capt Saldanha da Gama, whom you regarded (at least, when you wrote this) as a "gullible believer". Would it be a "reasonable explanation" to suppose that the sighting "wasn't considered important" by a gullible believer? No. Surely a believer would ensure that the reposnsible Navy authorities got all evidence and cooperation that they needed? Why would this believer not confiscate the negatives - unless the responsibility for doing so was not his to discharge? But of course, since my last post pointing out that Saldanha da Gama was _not_ after all the author of the supposedly scurrilous Bermuda Triangle book, and given the abrasive Sr Brito's recent characterisation of him as a strict Navy disciplinarian, we have perhaps changed our opinion of the man. If he was, instead, a prickly disbeliever, would he _then_ have been disposed to ignore the whole thing? Perhaps, but perhaps more likely still is that he would take the negatives and take disciplinary action as well - if disciplinary action in respect of the civilians was his to take. It comes down to jurisdiction, and this may not have been a simple issue in the circumstances. I suspect that Capt Bacellar's position gave him responsibility, and Capt Saldanha da Gama may have found himself obliged to provide only such assistance as was required. Barauna is quoted by a newspaper as saying that the Captain "of the ship" surveyed members of the crew to find out who had seen the object. The confidential Intelligence Dept report and Navy Ministry statements indicate that someone did, but the possibility exists that this is a misunderstanding. It could be that Barauna was referring to questioning done by Capt Bacelar (commander of the Trindade Oceanographic Post) rather than Capt. da Gama (commander of the ship) and that Barauna's reference to "the captain" was misinterpreted by the journalist quoting him. Bacelar was the man already placed in charge of the Navy High Command's effort to gather "information" on UAO sightings at Trindade, initiated more than a fortnight earlier on Jan 01 1958. He was the Navy's scientifically-trained expert on the spot and its specific agent appointed by Fleet-Admiral Carvalho. Vide February 13, 1958 CONFIDENTIAL memo from the Chief of the Navy High Command to the General-Director for Hydrography and Navigation: QUOTE Subject: Phenomena observed over the Trindade Island (Recommendations about) References: a) Radio 00012/312335 b) Document No. 005, of 1/6/1958, from the Chief of the Navy High Command to the Commander of the Trindade Island Oceanographic Post Annexed: Four (4) photographs and four enlargements. 1. Through the document listed in reference "b" this High Command asked for information on the phenomena observed and reported through the Radio listed in reference "a". 2. The information referred to was given personally at this High Command by the Corvette-Captain Carlos Alberto Ferreira Bacelar, who was the Commander of the Trindade Island Oceanographic Post at the time when the phenomena was observed. 3. An investigation was started at this High Command on the subject, with the following conclusions:... UNQUOTE Therefore Capt Bacellar would presumably have had authority in the investigation over Capt da Gama, even on board the Almirante Saldanha. Another reason for thinking so is that to the papers on Feb 22, Capt da Gama denies knowing anything (Folha da Manha, 22 Feb 1958) and says he hasn't even seen the photos: 'The Captain of "Saldanha da Gama," said: "It is strange that the fact was released to the press. I have nothing to say about the event. Only the Chief of Staff can make statements." Asked to tell his opinion about the photos, he said: "I confess sincerely that I have not yet seen the photos. I can't tell anything more."' But this appears to be in conflict with the statement by the US Naval Attache Capt Sunderland on March 11 that sometime on or before 24 February the Almirante Saldanha received an official visit from the CO of the USCG vessel Westwind when docked at Santos, during which Capt da Gama, whilst noncommital about the provenance, "freely discussed the flying saucer and showed the original proofs to the callers." If "original proofs" means copies of the photos, as it would appear (the same phrase describing the prints appears in the US ONI report), then Da Gama possibly did have the photos when he told the press that he had not seen them, which suggests the likelihood that he may have had more involvement than he was permitted to divulge to the press, and may possibly have made inquiries (presumably through his officers) about witnesses among the crew. We know that the ship's Executive Officer "formed the impression" shortly after the event "that those on deck had seen it", which presumably may indicate that he questioned people. And we know that Capt da Gama's personal Secretary, a Lt Commander, reported to the Capt prior to Feb 24 that he had seen the object himself. (From: U.S. Naval Attach=E9, Rio de Janeiro; Date of Information: 21-27 Feb 1958; Serial No: 39-58; Date of Report: 11 March 1958.) So it is possible that the ship's Captain and Officers themselves took action to canvas crewmembers, even if they perhaps did so formally-speaking at the request of Capt Bacelar. In any event, the practical jurisdiction on board re the negatives is proved by the fact of what happened. Bacellar took charge and assumed responsibility, consistent with standing instructions direct from the Fleet Admiral. That he chose to interpret those instructions as giving him a certain latitude for judgment, and judged his personal inspection of the negatives on the spot sufficient guarantee for Navy purposes, is unfortunate from a certain point of view. But only from a certain point of view. As Capt Brandao noted in his report after summoning Bacellar to the High Command to present his findings, it was remiss not to have taken charge of the film to be developed officially in a Navy laboratory. Do we suppose that Capt Bacellar did not think of this? I regard it as highly unlikely. In fact I suspect that this was in the forefront of his mind: He knew that once that film roll entered the bowels of the Navy High Command Intelligence Dept neither Barauna, nor he, nor perhaps the rest of the world, was likely ever to see it again. I suspect that it could have been a mixture of personal scientific curiosity, consideration for Barauna's personal rights and expectations, and maybe a pinch of altruistic indignation, that persuaded him to allow Barauna to take the negatives off the boat with him - with the stern stipulation that he not do anything further without Navy consent. (I'm tempted to speculate that an "understanding" along these lines could have been the substance of the further injunction or instruction about which Barauna said he had been enjoined by Capt Bacellar not to speak.) In the event, of course, we know what happened. The story escaped via Kubitschek and it was fait accomplis that the Navy just had to manage. You could say that Bacellar played a blinder. It's no surprise that Barauna so often expressed his gratitude to the Navy for their support. And now I wait for some more imaginative sceptic to feel his way towards the fat end of that wedge, and conclude from my reasoning that if Bacellar and Barauna could have had a private understanding after the event, well then they must have been in cahoots before it, too. Any takers? ;-) Martin Shough Listen to 'Strange Days... Indeed' - The PodCast At: http://www.virtuallystrange.net/ufo/sdi/program/ These contents above are copyright of the author and UFO UpDates - Toronto. They may not be reproduced without the express permission of both parties and are intended for educational use only.
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